Tehran-IRNA - In an interview with IRNA, a senior foreign policy expert, discussing the trend of indirect negotiations between Iran and the United States, stated: "In foreign policy, as in military affairs, it is sometimes necessary to surprise the enemy. This enemy is not necessarily the party you are negotiating with, but often a third party or group outside the negotiation room."
According to IRNA’s foreign policy correspondent, the aggression of the Zionist regime against Iran, with the complicity, collaboration, and support of the United States, has been temporarily halted after 12 days of fierce resistance and legitimate defense by the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran's Foreign Minister, Seyed Abbas Araghchi, in his latest interview with national television, emphasized that Iran has little trust in the Zionist regime’s commitment to halting its aggression and has warned regional and European mediators that any continuation of the Zionist regime’s aggression will face a harsh response from Tehran. One of the key questions in public opinion is whether Tehran had fallen into a U.S. negotiation trap and, now that the conflict has paused, how far the positions of the two sides have diverged since the fifth round of indirect negotiations mediated by Oman. These questions were discussed with Sasan Karimi, a senior foreign policy expert:
Trump Was Influenced by Netanyahu and Was War-Mongering
Looking back critically at the analyses over the past year, particularly since the start of indirect negotiations between Iran and the U.S. in April, can we say that many in Iran misjudged Donald Trump’s character and the U.S. approach toward the Islamic Republic, its nuclear program, and nuclear negotiations?
To address this, I’d go back a bit further than April, to around October, when warnings were repeatedly issued that Donald Trump’s election should be taken seriously, and preparations should have been made in advance. At the time, many said it was too early, and nothing was certain. However, we know that in other countries, the approach to U.S. presidential elections is different—they don’t waste the critical three-month period between the election and the president’s inauguration. That period is when the new administration’s foreign policy is shaped.
This didn’t happen in our case, and the mistaken analysis was based on the assumption that because Trump is a businessman, he is not inclined toward war. This view was widely circulated—that he avoids war and seeks deals at any cost. However, not every dealmaker is willing to make a deal at any price or with just anyone.
In foreign policy, as in military affairs, it is sometimes necessary to surprise the enemy. This enemy is not necessarily the party you are negotiating with, but often a third party or group outside the negotiation room. Therefore, accelerating the negotiation process after the second round, while reducing domestic political posturing, should have been prioritized. Additionally, Trump’s psychological profile was highly determinative, and while this was communicated to officials, it wasn’t taken seriously enough—what his characteristics, needs, and priorities were.
The notion that Trump, as a businessman, is a dealmaker was exaggerated, which I consider a significant cognitive flaw in our foreign policy. We often teach static information and classical methods in our foreign policy education, such as the influence of organizations or competing groups. Generally, we prefer to perceive what suits us. No politician globally is a purely rational actor; their decisions are influenced by personal, group, and environmental factors.
We assumed Netanyahu couldn’t influence Trump’s decisions, but he did. We thought that because Trump isn’t a man of war, he wouldn’t be war-mongering, but we now know he not only supports war but also backs aggression against our soil and supports-Israel. These could have been anticipated earlier, and better actions could have been taken before Trump assumed power. I don’t deny the efforts of anyone—neither the military, which is outside my expertise, nor the foreign policy apparatus, where experts have undoubtedly worked hard. However, I believe we are overly bogged down by bureaucracy in foreign policy-making. This excessive sluggishness sometimes pushes us toward extreme reactions, forcing us to compensate for shortcomings with media games.
Prolonged Negotiations Gave Opponents of Diplomacy a Chance to Sabotage
Based on your response, can I conclude that you believe negotiations between Iran and the U.S. should have started before April? If so, do you think it was possible to prevent the current scenario?
It took about five months to initiate these negotiations and open a previously closed door.
What caused this delay?
There was significant opposition, and many involved lacked the courage to contribute to policy-making to open this door. Thus, only a small part of the government pursued this, and the door was opened at a considerable cost.
Once negotiations began, we must note that indirect negotiations are highly inefficient for several reasons. First, they progress very slowly, like a translator with a delay. Second, unlike a translator, the mediator has its own interests, which undoubtedly affect message transmission. Third, the excessive slowness of this process—where you negotiate for a maximum of two hours a week—gives opponents of progress, such as Israel, U.S. lobbies, American war hawks, hardline Republicans, and others, ample time to act.
From the second round of negotiations, whether in Rome, Muscat, or elsewhere, we should have approached the talks with the mindset of staying and making significant progress. Instead of repeatedly stating our positions, with the other side doing the same, followed by one saying, “I don’t agree,” and the other responding, “Fine, I’ll talk to Trump,” we needed effective negotiations.
Iran Should Have Pressed Wittkopf More to Accelerate the Process
Contrary to your view, I believe the Iranian negotiating team emphasized their commitment to continuing negotiations from the start, and the Foreign Ministry spokesperson repeatedly stated Iran’s readiness to stay in Muscat or Rome until a result was achieved. Wasn’t the ball in the U.S. court?
Our interests depended on advancing the negotiations, so we were the ones who needed to pressure Wittkopf or anyone else. It’s possible this was deliberately designed, though I generally oppose conspiracy-based assumptions that view foreign policy as driven by hidden plots. From the second round, Trump shifted to a blame game, negotiating while implying that if talks failed, Iran would be responsible. The slow pace and Wittkopf’s lack of authority exacerbated this. One issue that should have been heavily negotiated was ensuring the U.S. side came with full authority to finalize the matter. Otherwise, merely showing political will could have been done via emails or interviews, without such an extensive process.
No Need for a Multi-Hundred-Page Agreement with Trump
What do you mean by saying Iran should have told the other side to come for an agreement and finalize it? During the JCPOA, over two years of negotiations produced a detailed text, but with Trump’s return to the White House, that text was torn up, and he withdrew from the deal. Iran had only held five rounds of talks before the military aggression and was preparing for a sixth. When you say the other side should come ready for an agreement, isn’t the timeframe too short for resolving such a significant dispute?
There are key differences here. First, under Trump, there was no need for a 154-page document like the JCPOA. Given Trump’s personality, that level of legal precision wasn’t necessary. He simply wanted an agreement bearing his name.
What Trump sought—and still seeks—is to enter any deal from a position of strength. Having failed to achieve results in issues like Ukraine and Palestine, he wants to present this as a triumph from a position of power. If negotiations with Iran continue, he’ll likely want to enter with the upper hand. If such legal precision wasn’t applied, couldn’t he find another excuse to violate the agreement?
In international negotiations, agreement violations are always possible. Even with the most precise text, two issues remain: first, some ambiguity in international agreements is deliberate, called “constructive ambiguity,” to address intractable issues and advance talks. Second, even if all issues are agreed upon, there’s no guarantee the other side will comply.
I’ve long emphasized that in foreign policy, international relations, and international law, there’s no guarantee like in domestic policy. Thus, if anything was to back an agreement with Trump, it was his own political will. He needed to seek an agreement registered in his name. Many details were already in the JCPOA, and it would have sufficed to, metaphorically, “put Trump’s hat on the JCPOA”—not to deceive, but to brand it with his name.
A Diplomat Must Use the Tools and Authority Provided by the Country
Let me disagree here. Trump didn’t just want an agreement with his name on it. For instance, Iran was ready to accept stringent verification measures, but after the fourth round, the U.S. raised the issue of zero enrichment, derailing talks that seemed to be progressing well, as zero enrichment is Iran’s red line. A simple agreement, as you suggested, included zero enrichment, creating a significant gap between the two sides.
I’m not saying we could have reached a result in this timeframe, but entering detailed drafting from the first and second rounds continuously—not two hours a week—could have been effective. Three weeks of intensive talks, followed by consultations, then resuming, would have worked.
Your question contains its answer: why did this happen from the fourth round? Because Trump’s policy on Iran’s nuclear program was shaped by lobbies from the third round. We, who should have shaped their policy, didn’t. Had we started with intensive negotiations and used other channels and lobbies, intermediaries might have acted to prevent U.S. policy from shifting toward zero enrichment.
This doesn’t mean we ignore Israel and the U.S.’s full responsibility for the war or Trump’s responsibility for exiting the JCPOA. But, as you initially noted, for a critical review, we shouldn’t only focus on the other side’s flaws. We must consider how we can act better in the future. One way is to better use the authority and tools our country provides. As a diplomat, I must use the tools and costs my country has invested in. Failing to do so not only wastes opportunities but may worsen things with other tools.
Israel Found an Opportunity to Lay Traps in the Negotiation Path
Some viewed the Zionist regime’s attack as a trap to derail negotiations, while others saw the negotiations themselves as a designed trap, believing Trump had no intention of reaching an agreement as the talks progressed, but rather aimed to buy time. Behind the scenes, other reports suggest the military attack was initially greenlit by the U.S. and later supported. Which view do you support?
I believe the first option: Israel set a trap for the negotiations. The idea that the talks were a U.S. trap to buy time raises the question: why would the U.S. need to buy time? What did it gain in these two months that it didn’t have before?
It gained public support by claiming it tried negotiating with Tehran but failed.
That excuse could always be made. I don’t believe the negotiations were merely a trap. We could have pulled the talks out of Israel’s trap, as I mentioned earlier. Israel found an opportunity to lay traps and mines in the negotiation path. Trump has no unbreakable loyalty to anyone, including Israel or even his own party. He only seeks what benefits him personally. For example, Netanyahu convinced him that this approach could build a greater legacy and bring results.
Trump Sought to Enter Negotiations with Iran from a Position of Strength
While we may have seen overlapping interests between Israel and the U.S. in the military aggression against Iran, were their goals also aligned? What was Israel’s goal in this attack, and did it achieve it? The same question applies to the U.S.
Israel’s goal was to derail negotiations, preventing progress and openness in Iran’s foreign policy. For Israel, Iran’s greatest utility is as a threat, what the Copenhagen School calls “securitization.” The main pretext for this is Iran’s nuclear program—not the program itself, but its securitization, which Israel has pursued since the 1990s for about 30 years. This is a separate issue they continue to push to solidify and elevate their regional and global position. I believe they were also surprised by Iran’s second military strike.
What Trump sought—and still seeks—is to enter any deal from a position of strength. Having failed to achieve results in issues like Ukraine and Palestine, he wants to present this as a triumph from a position of power. If negotiations with Iran continue, he’ll likely want to enter with the upper hand. More importantly, he aims to keep Israel satisfied and quiet—not just for Israel’s sake, but due to the significant pressure from U.S. lobbies on him, Congress, and the entire U.S. government.
Need to Strengthen Iran’s Defense, Intelligence, and Security Capabilities / We Should Not Be a Cheap Partner to Any Country
We Must Present a New Plan for the Next Round of Negotiations
Do you think Trump’s goal of having the upper hand at the negotiation table has been achieved today?
I doubt negotiations will continue in the style we desire. From the third round, I repeatedly asked where sanctions fit into these talks. When looking at U.S. rhetoric, even when they raised zero enrichment, it wasn’t in exchange for lifting sanctions but for removing threats. This view persists.
I believe we need a new plan, as it’s unlikely we can continue the negotiation style pursued from the time of Mr. Jalili, Rouhani, Khatami, the JCPOA era, the late Amirabdollahian, and up to now. This style, with its ups and downs, focused solely on the nuclear issue, enrichment, and capabilities to achieve sanctions relief. But this equation is no longer viable—neither Iran nor likely the U.S. is prepared for it.
Iran Must Push to Lift All Sanctions, Not Just Secondary Ones
Do you mean negotiations should be comprehensive?
Comprehensive negotiations in the strict sense are unlikely, but someone must have the courage to propose a solution attractive to all parties, especially Iran and the U.S., and to some extent the region, Russia, and European countries. Such a solution could yield outcomes that, if not leading to normalized relations, would place Iran’s foreign policy in a softer environment. The goal should be lifting all sanctions, not just secondary ones. Additionally, issues and problems between Iran and the West, particularly the U.S., can be categorized.
This is a broad outline that comes to mind now, but it’s far from simple to resolve in a few hours of thought. It requires elites in foreign policy, economics, and related fields to come together in a space likely provided by the government and leadership for brainstorming. The goal should be finding a solution to Iran’s foreign policy issues and disarming malicious actors like the U.S. and its European allies, whose behavior is no less than malicious. This requires precise design and extensive collaboration.
Reducing Defense and Military Issues in Negotiations Is Not Relevant
When you talk about lifting secondary sanctions, does that mean Iran and the other side should discuss non-nuclear issues? We know one such issue, recently mentioned in the French proposal, is Iran’s missile and defense capabilities. For a country that experienced 12 days of territorial aggression, is it easy to discuss these capabilities?
Absolutely not my intention, but we don’t have to respond to everything they say—we should set the agenda. In Iran’s contemporary history, from the Qajar era and especially since the Safavids, foreign policy, diplomacy, and negotiation have often been seen as near defeat, as if we only talk when we have no other options. This isn’t true. You can win or lose in war, economy, or diplomacy—both outcomes exist and are important.
We don’t have to concede to their demands. We’ve already given up some things without gaining anything in return. We can discuss matters that aren’t critical to us and sell them strategically. This requires specialized work and thought. This issue is global, not just ours—it’s a regional issue with various opponents. Some allies, like those in our region, the North, or China, may not view normalized relations positively, and this must be considered.
Reducing defense and military issues is not relevant to negotiations and should be expanded. In the current juncture, one priority in our internal review should be further strengthening our defense sector. We performed well in our attacks, but our defense, intelligence, and security capabilities need further reinforcement. We should shift focus from less critical issues, like lifestyle, to cultural institutions and prioritize strengthening our intelligence and security foundations.
For example, the public should take action, such as replacing “toxic” media with better, more realistic alternatives. This self-destructive addiction to certain media, which we all understand, must end. Social participation shouldn’t be limited to mere demands that the government fix everything. The unity created by this crisis can be a starting point for rethinking. If we seize this opportunity at both the governmental and national levels, it can be a leap forward. With an opportunity-driven approach, instead of closing everything off, we can confront our adversaries with openness.
Israel Will Intensify Efforts to Maximize Pressure on Iran
Do you think the so-called ceasefire will hold? After this direct military conflict—the first direct war between Iran and the Zionist regime in decades—where will Iran-Israel relations head? Will Israel stop here and leave the stage to Trump to pursue his plans, or could this disruptive actor re-enter the scene at any moment?
The ceasefire is initially very fragile, especially from the Zionist regime’s side. Its history shows it has never adhered to promises, agreements, or contracts. This isn’t an agreement but a temporary ceasefire, yet we’ve seen similar cases in Lebanon and elsewhere where Israel hasn’t honored them. One of its tactics is repeatedly violating agreements and accusing the other side to create psychological and fabricated wars.
In the current post-polar global order, where issue-based coalitions have replaced permanent alliances, to advance goals with various governments, you mustn’t be a cheap partner. To avoid this, you need balanced relations with partners and actors. You can’t cooperate with China on one hand and equate it with a small Western country on the other—it’s not feasible. You must diversify your relationship portfolio. Viewing the current situation as a Cold War-era bipolar world with permanent, unconditional alliances is a major cognitive flaw.
There’s a Western saying: “We are all soldiers of the Cold War.” If we think that in the Cold War’s bipolar era, aligning with one side meant unconditional support, that support was for their interests, not ours. Today, no one—Russia, China, the U.S., Europe, or others—operates this way. Look at Saudi Arabia’s approach: a diverse portfolio of large, medium, and small actors. The UAE and even China act similarly. We, too, must diversify our relations to avoid becoming anyone’s cheap partner.
Link to IRNA website [in Persian]
