In interview to Tabnak: Negotiating with the U.S. without a comprehensive plan is futile

Interview with Tabnak on July 9, 2025

Dr. Sasan Karimi believes that ceremonial negotiations could harm Iran, as they might benefit the opposing side's political resume without any clear agenda.Tabnak International Service Report: On the early morning of Friday, June 13, 2025, following a terrorist attack by the Zionist regime on Tehran and several other Iranian cities, a number of military commanders, scientists, and civilians were martyred.The Zionist regime's aggression against Iran was not limited to nuclear and military facilities or the assassination of nuclear scientists; industrial facilities and civilian targets were also attacked, resulting in the martyrdom of both military and civilian individuals.This aggression occurred while institutions like the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) did not condemn Israel's attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities. This was the first time since World War II that the IAEA failed to condemn an attack on a country’s nuclear facilities.

The UN Security Council also failed to issue any resolution or statement condemning this crime.In response to this aggression, and based on the right to self-defense outlined in the UN Charter, Iran retaliated by targeting military sites in the Zionist regime, ultimately leading to a ceasefire.Tabnak’s reporter conducted an interview with Dr. Sasan Karimi, a professor of international politics at the University of Tehran and head of the international politics program at the Nuclear Observation Think Tank. The interview follows:Israel’s surprise attack aimed to destabilize Iran’s political system, but Iran’s resilience turned the conflict into a war of attrition for the Zionist regime, which could have threatened its existence if prolonged. What is your assessment of this, and what do you believe Israel’s goal was in this military aggression?The goals of Israel and the U.S. in this war were entirely different. The war originated with Israel and Netanyahu personally. Israel’s domestic goal was clear: to bolster Netanyahu’s position and save his government from internal crises.Externally, the goal was to disrupt any diplomatic path to reduce tensions between Iran and the West and to continue the securitization of Iran.Israel believed that, due to Iran’s internal issues, the war could create social chaos and cause the system to lose control. However, they completely failed in this objective.While their attacks caused damage, both sides inflicted losses on each other. Iran also delivered significant offensive blows.In this conflict, both sides’ offensive capabilities outmatched their defenses. The war wasn’t attritional in the strict sense, as that requires prolonged conflict, but it was costly, though less so for Iran.Israel’s analysis of Iran’s military and social response was entirely wrong, though they weren’t entirely ineffective offensively.One of Iran’s calculations in this war was managing its weapons reserves in case the conflict prolonged. In the final days, Iran acted cautiously, launching limited but high-quality attacks on occupied territories. What is your assessment of this strategy?I don’t have precise information on Iran’s missile or launcher numbers, but Iran’s offensive strategy relies on high-volume attacks to overwhelm systems like the Iron Dome.This strategy focuses on widespread destruction rather than precision strikes. Iran needs a variety of missiles, as precision targeting is challenging due to defensive systems like the Iron Dome. In contrast, Israel operates with fewer but more precise and targeted strikes.Iran needs to significantly increase its offensive arsenal. In the war’s final days, Iran reduced its missile launches, possibly due to strategic calculations to manage reserves or specific political conditions we’re unaware of.This led to a halt in reciprocal attacks. Iran should invest in improving the precision and quantity of its missiles, which it has likely already done.One of the U.S.’s stated goals for attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities was to destroy its nuclear program. Trump initially claimed Iran’s nuclear program was completely destroyed, a claim echoed by Netanyahu. However, U.S. assessments showed Iran’s nuclear program was not significantly damaged. Yet, Trump implicitly relied on Israel’s assessments. Do you think the next steps by the U.S. and Israel depend on Israel’s assessments?Trump’s goals differ from those of other parts of the U.S. system and Israel. He seeks to portray himself as a hero, while others aim to pressure Iran. These are distinct objectives.Trump wants to show his actions were effective and brought peace. Meanwhile, Israel and the U.S. aim to strike Iran and maintain political pressure, oversight, and sanctions.A nuclear program, which includes knowledge, personnel, and organization, is distinct from nuclear facilities and cannot be easily destroyed, though facilities can be bombed.The damage to Iran’s nuclear facilities was significant but not trivial. The approach of Israel and figures like Grossi, who simultaneously strike and maintain pressure, has crossed acceptable limits.This issue should be pursued legally and politically by Iran’s Foreign Ministry.The U.S. claims it destroyed Iran’s nuclear program while also seeking negotiations with Iran. From the U.S. perspective, what do these negotiations emphasize? What are the concessions Iran and the U.S. seek if negotiations occur?Such negotiations hold little meaning for either side. I recommend Iran avoid entering talks without a comprehensive, operational plan based on precise calculations.Ceremonial negotiations could harm Iran, as they may benefit the opposing side’s political resume without a clear agenda.Negotiations merely for presence or generating news domestically and internationally are futile. They must be based on meaningful design, not just for the sake of negotiating.After Hamas’s October 7 attacks on Israel, the Iran-Israel conflict moved from a gray zone to direct confrontation. Given the high cost of this war for the Zionist regime, will these conflicts return to the gray zone?Israel’s military and financial costs are less significant, as they are offset by the U.S. and Europe. After each blow, Israel receives more weapons and financial aid, strengthening it. We shouldn’t view Israel as an isolated entity.Israel enjoys full Western support, particularly from the U.S. and Europe, a critical point to consider. A full return to the gray zone seems unlikely. Post-October 7, Israel is different and now seeks to escalate conflicts, as this benefits them. Israel’s provocations will likely continue in other forms.Iran has suspended cooperation with the IAEA but hasn’t withdrawn from the NPT. Some Western media speculate that Iran may have changed its nuclear doctrine. Could this be considered a deterrent by Iran?No, Iran has not changed its nuclear doctrine and has no such intention. Statements by individuals shouldn’t be attributed to the state’s decisions. Iran’s leadership remains committed to a peaceful nuclear program.Given the damage to nuclear facilities and national pride, a temporary suspension of IAEA cooperation is understandable. However, as officials like Mr. Araqchi have emphasized, cooperation continues under the Supreme National Security Council’s directives.Cooperation with the IAEA hasn’t been fully severed, but inspections are practically impossible in some cases due to damaged facilities. The continuation of cooperation depends on Iran’s foreign policy and national security considerations.

Interview by: Mahtab Bahrami Asteraki

Link to Tabnak