A Critical Turn in the Crossroads of Nuclear Diplomacy

Interview with Shargh Newspaper, April 16, 2025 - 

 

The interview was in Persian and the translation below was done by Ai.

 

One should be overly optimistic about Grossi’s trip

Sasan Karimi is another expert who, in his conversation with Shargh and in line with Mohammad Javad Jamali Nobandegani’s analysis, “describes Rafael Grossi’s trip to Tehran as a tool for Western pressure on Iran rather than an opportunity for diplomatic progress.” In addition to this point, the professor at the University of World Studies believes that “Grossi, under the influence of the United States and Israel, may disrupt the negotiations with harsh and ambiguous reports instead of helping them.” Continuing the interview, the senior foreign policy analyst, referring to Grossi’s performance record, sees him as “far from impartiality and a technical perspective” and says, “The experience of the past years has shown that the Director General of the Agency acts under the influence of Washington and Tel Aviv rather than adhering to technical principles.” According to the former deputy for political and international affairs of the presidential strategic office, “the best contribution that Grossi can make to the Oman negotiations is not to play a destructive role.”

Karimi explains that “Grossi usually makes optimistic statements and speaks of positive steps after private meetings in Tehran and elsewhere, but after returning to Vienna, he turns to ambiguity and refuses to confirm progress.” He continues his less optimistic view by adding that “the IAEA Director General, at the request of the European troika of JCPOA members (Germany, France and the United Kingdom), is preparing a draft of his comprehensive report for the upcoming meeting of the Board of Governors (June), and this report could influence the process of negotiations.” According to this foreign policy analyst, “If Israel presses, Grossi may prepare his report more quickly and publish it sooner to influence the negotiations and send the message to the Americans that he has prepared the ground for more pressure. But if the US goal is to continue the negotiations, Grossi will probably temporarily refrain from escalating the tension so that the negotiations do not reach a deadlock.”

Karimi continues the conversation with a more detailed analysis of Europe’s role in this diplomatic equation between Tehran, the US and the IAEA. Referring to the change of the location of the second round of negotiations from Rome to Oman, Sasan Karimi believes that “Europeans are not happy with this development.” He explains: “Europe, with its trigger mechanism, is trying to be an effective actor in the negotiations, but after being humiliated by Trump and left out of the bilateral negotiations between Iran and the US, it is now on the sidelines.” According to the former Deputy for Political and International Affairs of the Presidential Strategic Affairs Office, “Europeans are not willing to continue this process and are even dissatisfied that Iran did not choose Rome as the venue for the negotiations.” In line with this analysis, Karimi adds: “This dissatisfaction, along with the differences between Iran and the IAEA over the past three months, may push Europe towards harsher positions and greater alignment with the United States and Israel, which could slow down the pace of the negotiations and affect their length.”

The discussion continued to focus on explaining a key question: whether Grossi’s visit could affect American decisions and their reaction to the negotiations; Because some believe that the Americans are waiting to see what the outcome of the IAEA Director General’s presence in Tehran will be and whether Iran will take effective steps to resolve its differences with this institution (the agency), Sasan Karimi rejects this view and believes that “the United States, rather than being influenced by Grossi, may use him as a lever to advance its goals.” Explaining his statement, the professor at the University of World Studies states that “the Americans will probably turn Grossi’s role into a double game at this point; meaning that they will exploit his possible positions after his trip to Tehran and use it as a tool to pressure Iran.” From this perspective, Karimi emphasizes that “Grossi will meet with Western officials in Vienna after leaving Iran, and these meetings could become a tool to adjust America’s positions in the negotiations.”

The final part of the conversation was devoted to analyzing the question of whether Iran can use this opportunity to reduce its differences with the Agency and take the pretext from Europe and the United States. The foreign policy commentator, while recalling the efforts of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran to resolve some issues, believes that “these efforts by Tehran can reduce some of the differences with the Agency,” although, as he admitted, “one should not be overly optimistic.” It is from this perspective that Karimi notes: “Iran must act cautiously and, without making full concessions, proceed in a way that assures the international community of its good intentions, because resolving nuclear disputes is a complex and time-consuming process, and expecting a quick conclusion from this trip or the Oman talks is not realistic.”

 

 

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