Interview with Shargh Newspaper, January 8, 2025 -
The interview was in Persian and the translation below was done by Ai.
Abdolrahman Fathollahi: Recently, Kazem Gharibabadi, Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs, announced January 13 (January 24) as the date for a new round of consultations between Iran and three European countries to be hosted in Geneva. Esmail Baghaei, spokesman for the diplomatic service, also announced at a press conference this week, in response to a question about the new round of talks between Iran and Europe: “The second round of meetings will be held in Geneva on January 14 and 15, and the talks will continue in December.” Earlier, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi also referred to efforts to de-escalate tensions with Europe in an interview with China’s CCTV, and according to him, “a round of negotiations with European countries has taken place, and a second round of these negotiations has also been scheduled, which will be held with three European countries in less than two weeks.”
From claims about a new nuclear deal to the re-mediation of Paris
At the same time, a source close to Israeli and American sources claimed that representatives of three European countries offered Iran a new nuclear deal at a meeting in Geneva on December 29. Senior diplomats from the three European countries (France, Germany, and the United Kingdom) and Iran held a meeting in Geneva in late November. According to Donya Eqtesad, citing Axios, the news website, citing a European diplomat and two other sources, claimed that European diplomats told the Iranian side at that meeting that the JCPOA agreement was “null and void” and that a new agreement was needed to address the current situation of Iran’s nuclear program. According to this claim, European diplomats said that if the parties do not reach an agreement by September, they will use the mechanism for automatically reinstating UN sanctions against Iran. According to the report, Iranian diplomats have warned that if such a scenario occurs, they will withdraw from the NPT and end all inspections and monitoring of their nuclear facilities.
In addition to these points, French President Emmanuel Macron, in his latest statement, claimed that “Iran’s nuclear program is approaching the point of no return,” and said that Paris should have a strategic dialogue with the Trump administration about Iran. According to ISNA, Macron, who was speaking in Paris to French ambassadors to countries around the world, stated: “World leaders should ask themselves whether they should activate the mechanism for restoring sanctions against Iran before October 2025.” In his statements against Iran, the French President claimed that “Tehran is the main strategic and security challenge for France, the Europeans, the entire region and beyond, and this issue will be a key topic of discussion with the future administration of Donald Trump, the US President-elect.”
A path with many ifs and buts
According to what has been said, a range of analysts do not consider the 45-day gap between the December 25 meeting in Geneva and the second round of talks to be justified in any way, given some domestic, regional, and international conditions on the eve of Donald Trump's inauguration; especially since the engine of official negotiations aimed at easing tensions between Iran and Europe on January 15 is not yet set to be clear, and these meetings are still being held in the form of initial talks to assess the parties' demands and demands. Therefore, reviewing the path taken in easing tensions with the Europeans is the focus of "Sharq"'s discussion with Sasan Karimi. Of course, the Deputy for International Affairs of the Presidential Strategic Affairs Office considers the four-month track record and performance of the diplomatic apparatus of the fourteenth government in this regard (easing tensions with Europe) to be completely defensible. However, from the perspective of the lecturer at the Faculty of World Studies at the University of Tehran, “the main bottleneck in these negotiations is not Tehran but Europe, which is now seeking to delay the start of serious negotiations with Iran until Donald Trump comes to power.” What you read below is a summary of this conversation.
According to the news received, the second round of Iran-Europe talks is scheduled to be held on January 14, hosted by Geneva. Meanwhile, a range of observers consider the gap of more than a month between the first and second rounds of these talks to be unjustifiable, given the unprecedented conditions in the region and the world. This is while in your previous conversation with “Sharq”, you believed that the foreign policy apparatus of the 14th government and the minister himself are neither rushing the negotiations on the agenda nor seeking erosive negotiations, wasting opportunities, and negotiations for the sake of negotiations. But wouldn’t the fact that the second round of Geneva meetings is still defined in the form of a dialogue, consultation, and initial assessment of the demands and demands of the parties from each other, and that there is still no news of serious “negotiations,” be a clear example of wasting an opportunity?
The reality is that Tehran is not the bottleneck for the Islamic Republic of Iran to begin negotiations, whether with the three European countries that are members of the JCPOA (Germany, France, and the United Kingdom) or with the entire European Union. The Islamic Republic of Iran and the 14th government have repeatedly stated their readiness for negotiations in the past few months, but the issue is that there is currently no serious will on the part of Europe to begin negotiations. This quote from Dr. Zarif is also quoted as saying, “Europeans do not heal, but they blind.” Therefore, this same averting evil and managing tension with Europe is also defensible.
I will return to what you said, but for the time being, what is the reason that we are witnessing a delay or failure to begin serious negotiations on the part of the Europeans? Is the issue regarding the war in Ukraine or the transition period until the Trump administration comes to power?
I believe that the Europeans do not have the strategic capacity to solve current challenges, problems and issues and are seriously looking forward to the coming to power of Donald Trump to see what policy and plan the United States will implement towards Iran.
However, is the current situation defensible by the diplomatic apparatus of the 14th government? Are we not in a state of suspense; as if everything has been frozen?
The reality is that we must keep diplomatic channels with the West, and especially Europe, open until the Trump administration comes to power and see what scenarios will emerge regarding the Iranian nuclear issue, the war in Ukraine, developments in the Middle East, the trigger mechanism, and many other issues. If there is a suspense, it is because everyone is waiting for developments after January 20.
Let us return to the path taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the 14th government. The minister himself has repeatedly stated in interviews with domestic, regional, and international media that he is ready for serious negotiations, both with the American and European sides; in such a way that these positions are almost seen as a motif on the part of Araqchi, without any practical steps being taken in this regard. Contrary to your assessment, many believe that the first round of Geneva talks started very late and that in the very first weeks of the 14th government's inauguration, we could have held these talks with either Araqchi or Takht-Ravanchi, and at the same time that Josep Borrell was acting as the EU's foreign policy chief and before Ms. Kaya Kallas, who has an anti-Iranian outlook, came to power, the groundwork was laid for opening diplomatic channels. The negotiation calendar is not under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the minister, and numerous parameters are involved in this regard to determine the time for negotiations between the parties. On the other hand, Mr. Dr. Araqchi or any foreign minister cannot have a single guideline for negotiations. Sometimes, there may not be this readiness for negotiations within the country, and sometimes the other side, the Europeans, may not be willing to have serious and substantive negotiations for whatever reason, even though the broker may not agree with the decision made for negotiations. However, the minister must implement macro-level decisions and policies, not his own diagnosis and analysis. On the other hand, Mr. Dr. Araghchi is one of those cadres of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who have worked their way up from the bottom and have, so to speak, climbed the ladder of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs step by step and completely; therefore, one cannot expect more daring actions and decisions from Dr. Araghchi than one level. Considering Dr. Araghchi’s mentality, he is someone who tends to act within the framework.
Again, despite what you said, Abbas Araghchi’s record of several months can still be questioned; because it is at critical moments that individual initiatives can show the level of a political and diplomatic figure compared to other officials. This is while someone like Mohammad Javad Zarif in the Rouhani government, with individual initiatives, advanced the negotiations with the 5+1 in a defensible manner. But now there is no news of a personal initiative, nor is there any freezing of the de-escalation with Europe even at the level of the 13th government. In the last four months, the problems have been far more serious than the previous government. Do you consider this critical and pathological view permissible? In my opinion, in the current situation, it is not permissible to make such a pathological assessment of the foreign policy apparatus and of Dr. Araqchi himself. Of course, I respect all opinions and views, and I believe that even criticism should be heard. In addition, in the category of individual initiatives, attention should be paid to the mood and view of each individual. Certainly, if I were the Minister of Foreign Affairs, I would have acted differently from Dr. Araqchi, just as Dr. Araqchi has acted differently from Dr. Zarif. Therefore, this is a completely natural issue.
Isn't this statement of yours a kind of justification and running away? In the first Rouhani government, wasting opportunities was not allowed at all, and serious negotiations were on the agenda as the center of the government's activities without wasting time.
Firstly, we must look at the issues within the time frame of each period. The current conditions of the country, the region, and the world in general are different from 10 years ago. Secondly, each person's performance is based on his own perspective, analysis, and assessment.
Some may prioritize personal initiatives. As Dr. Zarif did, of course, you are aware that Dr. Zarif has paid and is paying a lot of money for these initiatives. But some may also have the assessment that the "costs" of personal initiatives are far greater than their "benefits," and for this reason they will try to act based on the same structure-agent category and within the framework of macro policies, nothing more than that, and seek to build trust and gain internal support, and then they will take the initiative. For this reason, as I said, due to the sentiments I know from Dr. Araqchi, he is trying to move forward within the established framework.
So there is no news of Zarif’s diplomatic streamlining by Araqchi and we should not look for a figure that is on par with the current Foreign Minister?
I repeat again that no one can be compared with another person. Every individual and every Foreign Minister acts based on his own circumstances, sentiments, and evaluation. In addition, the requirements of time and place, as well as domestic, regional, and global conditions, also affect the performance of each person. It is possible that if Dr. Zarif were the Foreign Minister now, he would act differently than in the previous period, which is completely natural. Therefore, I do not consider this comparison to be very permissible.
Incidentally, your point confirms what I said; because in the Rouhani government, whether in the negotiations of the first government, in the negotiations of his second government, or in the negotiations of the Raisi period, there was no such thing as a deadline. But now we have until October 18, 2025 (26 Mehr 1404) and before the expiration of Resolution 2231 as the guarantor of the implementation of the JCPOA. Although some believe that practical steps can be taken to activate the trigger mechanism at the upcoming quarterly meeting of the Board of Governors in March of this year. So with such a limited opportunity, we basically cannot seek negotiations for the sake of negotiations and time periods of more than a month, and that was to follow up on the dialogue and initial assessments? The point is that you are looking at the issue solely from Tehran's perspective. We cannot talk to ourselves and conduct negotiations. Should the other side also have this readiness to conduct negotiations? For whatever reason, Europe is not seeking negotiations until the Trump administration comes to power; because it does not have the strategic capacity to resolve differences, challenges, and problems, and they are waiting for Washington to have the necessary track and act accordingly.
Your points are correct, but when there is a gap of more than a month between two rounds of Geneva talks...
Yes, I agree with part of what you said, and I do not consider this gap to be a good sign. But at the same time, I must emphasize that this bad signal was not sent by Iran. In the meantime, and following your emphasis on the issue of individual initiatives, I mentioned in my proposal to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a set of different and diverse diplomatic initiatives should be put on the agenda to put the mindset of Donald Trump's administration and Trump himself on the right and positive path towards Iran so that his activism regarding Iran can take shape, which of course requires its own precise and specific planning.
So you also acknowledge initiatives; something that is currently lacking?
What I mean is that we must move in a direction that does not allow the enemies of the Islamic Republic of Iran to create a negative image of our country for the new US administration and Donald Trump personally, which will be the driving force behind Washington’s actions and decisions against Tehran; rather, our activism should shape this image for Trump.
To what extent do you agree with the criticism that the country’s diplomatic chief has tried to be passive against domestic radicals over the past four months, instead of being independent in his approach?
I do not consider this criticism to be correct at all, and by the way, if you have paid attention, over the past few days he has been the target of attacks and sabotage in cyberspace and Twitter by these same domestic radical currents. While in my opinion, Mr. Dr. Araghchi is trying to reach a level of alignment with some of the ruling party forces in order to build trust and provide a basis for joint work. In fact, Mr. Dr. Araghchi considers himself a representative of the entire system of the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is a completely correct and defensible view.
In the meantime, it is quite natural that when someone wants to represent all the internal currents, they cannot achieve complete success and some currents will be dissatisfied with him. Despite this, and in general, Mr. Dr. Araghchi is not one to appease or be passive with any current and, within the framework of macro policies, seeks to secure national interests. Let us also address the gap between Tehran and the West regarding the negotiations.
In a recent interview with China’s CCTV, Abbas Araghchi emphasized negotiations based on the JCPOA model, but it seems that the West is trying to pursue comprehensive negotiations or negotiations on everything or nothing. Do you see such readiness in Tehran for comprehensive negotiations?
So far, I do not see such readiness in Tehran for comprehensive negotiations. Of course, what is at stake is multi-axial or multi-dimensional negotiations. It should be acknowledged that an agreement like the JCPOA was an exception in the field of Iranian foreign policy. But at present, we may need to pursue multi-axial or multi-axial negotiations and have the necessary scenarios and designs in this regard. Here too, there is not much difference or much problem in wanting to negotiate on one axis, two axes, three axes or several axes. Moreover, negotiation on any issue does not mean mere surrender and concessions. Certainly, in every negotiation, we give and take concessions, but in general, I do not see such certainty for holding comprehensive negotiations or multidimensional and multi-axis negotiations in Tehran. However, it does not hurt to think about this issue and, as I said, to have the necessary scenario-building and planning.
Should we put two axes of negotiations with Europe and the United States on the agenda independently, in parallel, and simultaneously, as some believe? Because apparently, unlike the Rouhani era, we have lost both sides of the Atlantic.
Now the situation is completely different from the past, and the Europeans have come to the realization that they must rely on the United States more than ever. Therefore, in my opinion, investing too much in negotiations with Europe alone can cost us a lot.
But now many European countries, and especially Germany, are acting much more radically than the United States. Is it different?
Yes, your point is correct, but I still believe that Europe's final decision depends on American policies.
If so, the countries of the region can also be analyzed with the same perspective. So how did Abbas Araqchi prioritize regional diplomacy in these four months, even with the justification of the war in the Middle East and the developments of October 2023, when Iran's peripheral countries undoubtedly also take a serious look at American policies?
Yes, your analysis is correct, and the entirety of Iran's foreign policy should be seen on a larger scale; because there is a kind of following of the countries of the region from the United States. The important thing here is that we can seek to strengthen peripheral and regional relations at the same time as de-escalating tensions in relations with the West.
As you said, the regional equations are certainly a function of Iran's de-escalation with the West, and especially the United States. But your statement is in contrast to Araqchi's performance, which we witnessed several rounds of diplomatic tours due to the ongoing developments in West Asia. Although a range of observers considered the condemnation of some Arab countries in the region after the Day of Repentance operation by Israel to be due to the regional diplomatic moves of the Foreign Minister, it is equally possible to criticize that after the developments in Syria, one of the biggest or largest regional absentees at the Aqaba summit in Jordan was Iran. So how should the issue be analyzed with this contradiction or double standard?
The issue is not a contradiction. Look, the developments you are referring to are the result of interactions over several years, so you cannot expect the Foreign Minister and the foreign policy apparatus to be able to handle all matters within a few months. In any case, the Minister and the foreign policy apparatus have a specific and determined capacity, and by the way, in my opinion, they have exceeded their capacity in these few months. In addition, the current situation is not a situation that diplomacy has created. So we cannot expect that the developments resulting from the conflict of interests of regional and trans-regional actors and the activism of many currents will be resolved by the role of a foreign minister for a few months, and that the developments in the region will generally be in our favor. This is a very high demand and expectation from the foreign ministers and the foreign policy apparatus. Of course, at this point, the diplomatic apparatus has done its job correctly.
I agree with this part of your statement that the current developments are not the result of diplomacy, but there is an expectation that the way out of these developments and conditions will be strengthened by diplomacy; is it different? Just as after every war, ultimately it is diplomacy and the negotiating table that can determine everything.
Your point is correct, but this expectation is not a small expectation. You cannot resolve a crisis that is the result of years and even decades of regional and trans-regional actors' actions and has now reached an unprecedented situation through diplomacy in a few months. Moreover, the diplomatic apparatus of the 14th government began its work in the midst of a crisis and war. Therefore, we must have a realistic view and proper expectations from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister himself.
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