Interview with Sharq Newspaper, November 28, 2024 -
The interview was in Persian and the translation below was done by Ai.
After the sanctions on airlines and shipping lines in the country's ports, in parallel with the issuance of a resolution last Thursday by the three European countries that are members of the JCPOA at the IAEA Board of Governors, Majid Takht-Ravanchi, Deputy Foreign Minister for Political Affairs, is scheduled to hold talks today (Thursday) with Enrique Mora, Deputy Secretary-General of the Union's External Action Service, and tomorrow (Friday) with his German, French, and British counterparts in Geneva. Although there is no discussion of "official negotiations" yet and everything is limited to initial meetings and discussions, opposition from domestic radicals has begun. Do you believe that under such circumstances, the 14th government will be allowed to continue working to bring about de-escalation with the West, and specifically Europe and the United States?
First of all, let me say to the resident that I do not like the use of the word "permission" in your question.
Why?
Because it does not seem that the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are allowing domestic radicals to do what you say. In any case, the government was elected in a democratic, legitimate, legal and official election and came to power and took control of affairs, which has a specific approach in all areas, especially foreign policy. Therefore, both Dr. Pezhakian as President and Dr. Araghchi as Minister of Foreign Affairs and other ministers of this government must act based on their declared policy, which is within the framework of the general lines of the Islamic Republic of Iran system.
But do the confirmations and denials regarding Elon Musk’s meeting with Amir Saeed Iravani reveal the opposite of what you think?
No, it is not. It is natural to imagine that some newspapers or journalists and some political figures from certain political factions and movements have a bias or a different assessment of some developments, and this trend also exists in all democratic and electoral countries. But the problem here is that these individuals and movements should not be influenced by applying pressure; that is, these individuals and movements should not be allowed to influence the government and the missions, tasks, decisions, and approaches of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through applying media pressure.
Your point is correct in a vacuum, but the discussion about the confirmation and denial of the meeting between Elon Musk and Amir Saeed Iravani has not yet cooled down, and we are suddenly witnessing the tuning of the instrument of opposition to the Geneva talks?
The issue of Mr. Iravani’s denial of Elon Musk’s meeting with Mr. Araqchi was not as stated, but in any case, the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister himself should be so open within the framework of the communicated policies that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister himself can take the necessary action, which I think is the case. That is, to the extent that is deemed appropriate and within the framework of the permission given to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and based on decisions made by the higher levels of the system, the scope of effective action has been determined for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and this issue is explained at the higher levels of governance. Of course, this issue is not limited to Iran, and it is the same in all countries where the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the implementer of macro policies that are communicated to them through higher levels. Now, in the meantime, it is neither acceptable nor justifiable for some journalists, some newspapers, and political figures to use pressure in cyberspace or in the media to change the approach of the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or to interfere in their decisions, actions, and duties.
In a recent conversation I had with Mr. Falahatpisheh, he did not have a very positive view of the start of the Geneva talks, and Ravanchi considers his meeting with his German, French, and British counterparts to be a “return to the first step of the game of snakes and ladders of negotiations and agreement.” As this member of parliament said, “We have advanced in negotiations to the final step of signing the agreement, but domestic, regional, and trans-regional radicals did not allow the negotiations and agreement to come to fruition.” Now, do you believe that the Pezizian government can act differently from the Raisi and Rouhani governments?
Firstly, Mr. Raisi’s government cannot be compared to Rouhani’s at all.
For this reason, I used the Rouhani and Raisi governments together, as both in the twelfth government (the second Rouhani government) and in the thirteenth government (the Raisi government), every time negotiations took place, domestic radicals did not allow them to come to fruition.
Incidentally, contrary to what you said, the JCPOA negotiations did come to fruition under Mr. Rouhani’s government. Meanwhile, the JCPOA negotiations themselves were accompanied by the greatest pressure, opposition, and sabotage from domestic radicals, but despite all this pressure and sabotage, the government of the time and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with the role of Dr. Zarif and Dr. Araghchi, brought the negotiations to a conclusion.
This was not the case in Rouhani’s second administration. Was it?!
You see, the issue is not that negotiations are held and come to a conclusion and that we imagine that as soon as we bring negotiations to a conclusion, all our problems will be solved. The realities of the international scene are not like this. With people like Donald Trump, the requirements of the international scene really remind us of something else, that everything will be solved with a negotiation or a dialogue or even an agreement. Meanwhile, there are different scenarios for what fate a political agreement will have, which will be based on the same requirements and realities of the international scene. Some agreements and negotiations have a good fate and some do not; this is a different matter.
So what is the issue?
The scope of the government, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs apparatus, and the government in general in the field of foreign policy will be clearly defined in the negotiations, and to what extent. Just as there was the greatest pressure and obstruction on the government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs during the Rouhani government and the JCPOA negotiations, an agreement was finally reached. Now, Dr. Pezzekian’s government and Dr. Araghchi himself will take the same path and will not be pressured by those who believe in hasty negotiations, nor will they surrender to newspapers and figures who believe in closing all doors to dialogue. The fact is that Iran, with its self-confidence and its defined principles, has never shied away from negotiations, meetings, dialogue, and de-escalation, and is always ready to pursue diplomatic solutions to disputes with any party, whether Europe or the United States. With this in mind, obstructionism can take a more serious form while trying to start negotiations, as long as the current challenges continue; Because until some kind of cohesion is formed inside, negotiations will not have a strong support.
You see, simply negotiating and pursuing the resolution of differences through diplomacy does not mean surrendering or making concessions. Unfortunately, this is the perception that exists inside that simply negotiating means surrendering and making concessions. But negotiating in itself is not giving concessions; that is, it is not something that we want to sell negotiating to the other side and have the impression that as soon as we are at the negotiating table with you, Europe or America must definitely give us concessions. No, it is not like that. These kinds of meetings, negotiations, and conversations are held so that the parties have a comprehensive assessment of each other. Perhaps the level of differences and faults on both sides is really very high; to the point that these talks and negotiations do not lead to results. Therefore, in order to understand the depth of the differences and the extent of the gap between the parties, we must talk and negotiate to determine how far apart the two sides really are. It is not really the case that we want to sabotage and put pressure on the government and the foreign policy apparatus by holding negotiations or meetings. Basically, the most important task of the diplomatic apparatus is to pursue the resolution of disputes through dialogue and negotiation.
Meanwhile, some believe in appeasement and passivity of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister himself against the radicals. Do you also believe in such appeasement and passivity?
Appeasement for what reason?
In one specific case, by threatening and publishing a newspaper, the Minister denied the fact of the meeting between Musk and Yerevan three times; while the spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had previously denied this.
Just as I did not agree with the use of the word "permission" in the first question, here too I do not like the use of the word "appeasement" or "passivity" by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister himself. In any case, given their background, experience and knowledge, Dr. Araghchi is a seasoned diplomat and considers all aspects to take any action and follow up on any decision, and at any given moment, they adopt the best reaction and the best position. Now, at some points, such as the meeting between Elon Musk and Mr. Iravani, Dr. Araghchi himself denies this meeting several times. I do not know the exact reason for this, but I do not think that he wants to react in this way due to pressure or threats from a newspaper or a political figure, but rather the issue goes back to the requirements of national interests and security, as well as the technical approaches of Mr. Araghchi and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, if the essence of this meeting did not take place according to Dr. Araghchi's statement, the minister's repeated denials cannot be a subject of discussion or criticism. Therefore, I find it unlikely that pressure from a newspaper or a political figure caused this reaction by Mr. Araghchi, and I also find it unlikely that Dr. Araghchi can be considered as appeasing or passive and surrendering. As I said, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mr. Araqchi himself, at the helm of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran, will neither surrender to currents that are hastily and by any means seeking dialogue with the West, nor, as you say, will he surrender, appease, and be passive towards currents that emphasize closing all doors to dialogue.
How do you see the possibility of pursuing a policy of negotiation for the sake of negotiation in the new government? Considering the point you mentioned, both the level of differences between Iran and Europe is so serious that such meetings in Geneva will not lead to a result, and a wide range of issues, from the nuclear file to human rights, the war in Ukraine, the war in the Middle East, and... have played their part in the formation of cold relations between Iran and the Green Continent, and have caused this unprecedented level of fault in the relations between the two sides. Meanwhile, in the Raisi administration, the strategy for negotiations with the West, whether with Europe or the United States, was based on the same policy of negotiations for the sake of negotiations and eroding the talks in order to buy time for Tehran?
No, I do not have such an idea and I specifically believe that at least in the administration of Mr. Rouhani and in the administration of Mr. Dr. Pezhakian, the approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not based on negotiations for the sake of negotiations or eroding talks to buy time. If we want to be realistic, Iran is not currently in a situation where it can put negotiations for the sake of negotiations or eroding talks on the agenda or wants to conduct talks for "nothing", so if now in Mr. Pezhakian's administration the final decision is to hold talks, they are at least seeking to reach an agreement or result, meaning there is a will.
Is there a will to achieve a conclusion to the negotiations?
Now, whether these negotiations, meetings and talks will come to a conclusion or not is another matter, just as any negotiation in the world can come to a conclusion or not. But Mr. Pezhikian’s government and Mr. Araqchi himself do not have the spirit to pursue negotiations with no goal or negotiations for the sake of negotiations, so I repeat and emphasize that if negotiations are held, it will definitely be for the sake of achieving results. Now we need to see whether the differences of opinion and the depth of the gap between the parties allow for a result to be achieved or not. Reaching or not reaching a result is not a reason for us not to negotiate or to imagine that because a result has not been reached, the principle of conducting negotiations was wrong. We need to negotiate to reach an assessment and we need to understand how deep the gap is and whether there is a basis and space for reaching a result and a win-win agreement.
To borrow from Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf’s remarks on Tuesday, he said, “There was a time when, in the face of threats from enemies, we said we would close oil to you, and the threat was our leverage, but today and with this situation, which oil will we close and which market do we have?” This sentence has an implicit reference to the legend of the cold autumn and winter that was raised just after the August 1402 visit of Josep Borrell, the head of the European Union's foreign policy, to Tehran. At that time, Borrell explicitly stated that his proposed package was the last resort to reach an agreement, and with this mentality of the internal radicals in the 13th government, the negotiations ultimately failed. Now that the whispers of Geneva talks have been raised, the radicals are again beating the drum of not negotiating. Although the outlook and approach of the Raisi government cannot be compared to the Pedsikian, the internal radicals who have the same approach with double the power. Can we imagine a fate like the cold autumn and winter for the negotiations ahead of the Pedsikian government? Firstly, to imagine that the theory of the cold autumn and winter was raised by several media outlets and caused the late Raisi government to change its outlook and decision on dialogue with the West is somewhat far from reality.
Why?
Because this theory was a central idea put forward by a group close to the 13th government, and it was only reported by the media. Of course, I do not deny that some media outlets had the same advice to stop negotiations with the West based on this theory. Now, how right or wrong this theory or advice was, let alone how right or wrong it was, time will clearly show whether it was right or wrong. But the fact is that the theory of the cold autumn and winter was not simply a media reaction, but rather the actions of politicians and diplomats of the late Raisi government. Therefore, now we must also ask the views and opinions of the political and diplomatic section of Mr. Pezizkian’s government and proceed based on it, just as in Mr. Raisi’s government, they proceeded based on the same theory of the cold autumn and winter and reached that conclusion, and we saw that that theory did not lead to any results in practice. This is where I repeat what I said again that some groups believe that simply negotiating means that it must end in a result. No, we have no guarantee of achieving a result here. We have an analysis that we will conduct negotiations based on the current necessities and requirements of the country and based on the macro framework of the system and the policies communicated by the higher authorities. Whether or not a result is achieved will be after the negotiations, not before. Similarly, not negotiating has its own consequences. In Mr. Raisi’s government, based on the theory of the cold autumn and winter, they stopped the negotiations and had their own consequences. Now, Dr. Pezzekian’s government has negotiations on the agenda, and we must see whether a result will be achieved based on the analysis, outlook, and approach of Mr. Pezzekian’s government.
I have serious criticism of your analysis and assessment during the interview.
In what sense?
From the perspective of “structure-agent”, there is not much difference between Zarif, Amir Abdollahian, and Araghchi, and they are all implementers of the communicated policies.
In my opinion, their difference is clear. As soon as we put the performance of Dr. Zarif and Dr. Araghchi next to the late Amir Abdollahian, their difference becomes apparent.
However, Zarif explicitly stated in an interview that his role in the field of foreign policy is almost zero.
No, he did not say that my role in the field of foreign policy is zero, but rather stated that in the field of determining macro policies related to the diplomatic field, various agencies, organizations, and institutions play a role, and one of these institutions is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This means that determining and explaining the macro principles of foreign policy is not solely the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are not the only institutions to outline the entire macro principles of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In fact, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Minister have the role of implementing these macro policies.
Considering the set of points you mentioned, what is your assessment of the Geneva talks? Is the Pezizian government really trying to use the Green Continent as a mediator for larger negotiations with the second Donald Trump administration by de-escalating tensions in relations with Europe, or are we witnessing parallel negotiations with the Europeans?
None.
For what reason, none?
Because what is going to happen in Geneva right now is not a serious negotiation, but merely a meeting and initial talks. I emphasize again that the purpose of holding the Geneva talks is to have an initial assessment of each other and to understand the level of disagreement between the parties and whether or not we can create space for more serious negotiations. Nothing is certain at the moment and we cannot make any achievements or conclusions for the Geneva talks. We are starting the talks right now and these initial talks are for a more detailed assessment of each other. Whether the talks are to improve relations with Europe or whether we want to use the Europeans as mediators for negotiations with the Trump administration is a secondary issue. First, we need to see what happens in Geneva and what the parties think of each other. We must also consider that the mere presence of Dr. Araghchi, Dr. Ravanchi, and Dr. Zarif in the Pezzekian government should not create false expectations in the media and public opinion that the Geneva talks or the continuation of possible negotiations can lead to a result. In any case, the differences of opinion, challenges, problems, and current conditions in the international system are very different from the Raisi and Rouhani governments. We are facing a completely new situation that has become more complicated, difficult, and ambiguous with the coming to power of a being named Donald Trump. However, Dr. Araghchi and Dr. Ravanchi personally act based on national interests and national security and are neither influenced by currents that are hastily seeking negotiations with the West at any cost, nor do they surrender to extremist currents that are trying to close the doors of diplomacy by any means.
Again, I disagree with part of what you said. It is absolutely certain that we are facing a wide range of challenges, from the war in Ukraine and the nuclear issue to human rights and developments in the Middle East and many other issues in the emergence of this level of fault with the West and Europe in particular, and this issue has made the negotiations in the Mejdisian government more complicated and difficult than those of Rouhani and Raisi. However, the internal situation of the country, from the energy imbalance to the problems of livelihood, economy, politics, society, culture, etc., does not allow us to enjoy the level of freedom of action that you mentioned and to imagine that the Mejdisian government has unlimited opportunities. Let us not forget that in about a month, the Donald Trump administration will come to power, and on the other hand, by October 1404, the trigger mechanism will be activated by the Europeans. Your point is correct in one respect. We should not act in a hurry or hasty manner in the negotiations, and urgently present the terms of the negotiations with Europe and the United States, just because the level of differences is so high and the current conditions in the country also necessitate negotiations, in order to show ourselves in an “urgent” state. We should not put ourselves in a diplomatic hurry, nor do we have the opportunity for erosive negotiations. I mentioned earlier that the country will not allow us to waste opportunities and erode the negotiations. But let’s not forget that the Europeans and Americans are now much more aggressive than in previous years. The level and severity of the sanctions, as well as the tone of the European and American authorities against us, are completely unprecedented, and this has made the negotiations by the Iranian government more difficult and complicated. That is why I say that there should not be any kind of atmosphere-building and achievement-building in the media from the Geneva talks, because if no results are achieved, a kind of despair will form in society. We need to see where the atmosphere is heading, what the initial assessments of the parties are of each other, and whether we can lay the groundwork for easing tensions in European relations or whether relations will progress in a direction that will allow us to start negotiations with the United States? As I said, it is possible that the talks will not come to fruition at all, or that we will not be able to use Europe as a mediator for negotiations with the Donald Trump administration. Although I believe that the European Union is not a good mediator for negotiations with the United States. Experience has shown this, in any case, every scenario must be pursued in a state of psychological calm and diplomatic calm. For this reason, I strongly recommend “neither rushing nor wasting opportunities and eroding the negotiations.” Mr. Pezzekian’s government and Dr. Araghchi himself are ready for serious, result-oriented negotiations. Whether it takes one day or 10 years depends on the atmosphere of the negotiations. What is important is that the negotiations are both serious, result-oriented, and progressive.
Contrary to what you stated, we are witnessing an atmosphere of ambiguity or a deliberate policy of ambiguity by Tehran towards the West. On the one hand, the Geneva talks and the green light for negotiations are on the agenda, and on the other hand, a spectrum is maneuvering to change the nuclear doctrine. What does this sine wave mean? Except that an atmosphere of erosion in negotiations and pursuing a policy of ambiguity is on the agenda?
The fact that some political and media currents are talking about changing the nuclear doctrine and building nuclear weapons is merely a suspicion... .
Is it a suspicion?
Yes, the nuclear doctrine of the Islamic Republic of Iran is based on the macro policies of the system, and we are not seeking to build nuclear weapons, so I do not see a policy of ambiguity at all. A policy of transparency in diplomacy is the best and least expensive way to de-escalate tensions, because the Islamic Republic of Iran has nothing to hide or obscure.
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