The potential gap between the Arabs and Israel has become real; Iran can use this leverage to influence the next actions of Washington and Tel Aviv

Interview with Etemad Online, October 6, 2024 - 

 

 

The interview was in Persian and the translation below was done by Ai.

 

The diplomatic moves of Mr. Peshkian’s government in the region have accelerated a day after Iran’s retaliatory action under the name of Operation True Promise 2. It seems that the Islamic Republic is actually seeking to reduce the level of tensions and prevent a widespread regional confrontation. Can Mr. Peshkian’s visit to Doha after Iran’s military response to Israel be explained in this context? Basically, the purpose of this visit went beyond attending the Asian Nations Forum? What message did he carry for whom or to whom?

It is not known whether any messages were exchanged between the parties during this visit. However, it can be firmly stated that Mr. Peshkian did not travel to Doha solely with the aim of reducing tensions. However, countries usually use these opportunities and situations. Situations such as multilateral diplomacy or high-level visits between officials, etc. are carried out with this goal. In order to use these ceremonial visits as a bridge to manage tensions when we find ourselves in a situation like the current one. Therefore, it is natural that Mr. Pezhikian and Araghchi will exploit these conditions and use the bridge between Iran and Qatar or even the bridge that exists between Iran and Oman at specific junctures. The reality is that Iran not only does not seek an all-out war, but even intends to use its political capital for peace. But this does not mean that it wants to take action out of weakness and lack of capability in the conflict. For this reason, the IRGC's retaliatory operation under the name of the Honest Promise 2 was carried out. After that, Iran, citing the legal clause of the United Nations Charter, proved that the escalation of tensions was carried out by the Israeli side and that Iran took action in response to a threat to its territorial integrity. Then they took diplomatic measures to manage tensions and prevent an all-out war, because it has become clear to all countries in the region and the world that Israel is seeking to escalate tensions and also disrupt stability in the region. The factor that disrupts stability in the region was the same label that they gave to Iran, but now everyone is aware that Israel is the factor that destabilizes the region.

Mr. Araqchi's trip to Beirut took place immediately after his return from Qatar and in a situation where Israeli attacks on Lebanon had intensified, because southern Lebanon was once again targeted by Tel Aviv's bombings and even hours before his arrival in Beirut, the area around the country's airport was targeted by Israeli attacks. In these circumstances, what was the purpose of Mr. Araqchi's regional trip, including Lebanon, given the political siege it was under?

Iranian officials will definitely enter these countries by accepting the specific conditions of the region during their trip. Mr. Araqchi must have accepted this and it is not a major issue. The reality is that Iran is aware that many Hezbollah commanders have been assassinated and martyred by Israel; therefore, they must be present in the countries and operational areas where members of the Resistance Axis are stationed. This presence is not possible in Gaza, but it is possible in Beirut. Therefore, Iran’s first step to managing tensions and strengthening the Resistance Axis is to have a positive psychological impact on the consolidation of Hezbollah forces through its presence in these countries. In the next step, it can create empathy among Hezbollah’s command forces to create conditions for accelerating the pace of reconstruction activities and redefining a new generation of commanders. Therefore, Mr. Araqchi’s presence was important from a political, symbolic, organizational, and operational perspective. In this way, he can convey the message to other actors, especially Israel, that we have an active presence in the region and are setting the agenda. Second, they inject a new spirit into Hezbollah forces. Third, they seek to create empathy among the resistance forces in an organizational perspective. Although empathy still exists, organizationally we need unity of approach in command at the moment, and his presence is definitely effective.

Some observers analyzed Mr. Pezhikian’s joint meeting with members of the Gulf Cooperation Council in this way: Iran attended the Doha meeting with the aim of gaining the consensus of the Arabs, who play a role as allies of the United States. Another group examined these interactions from another angle and, citing the approach of the Arab actors on the Persian Gulf, claimed that in the event of a possible confrontation, regardless of this group’s fear of escalating tensions, they cannot be expected to end their passive approach. Which of the above statements is credible?

It seems that Israel's position in the region is now weaker than a few years ago or even before the October 7 operation. Even if Israel intends to take military action against Iran with the support of the United States or carry out movements similar to a military attack; it has little chance of being able to exploit the territorial and non-territorial capabilities of Arab countries, especially the southern Persian Gulf, to its advantage. The grounds for restoring Iran's relations with Arab countries have already been prepared, but under Mr. Pezzekian's government, this issue is moving forward with greater speed and richness of content. This issue is very important. The active activism of Mr. Pezzekian and his government, whether in New York, Doha or Iraq, has brought the Arabs closer to Iran and distanced them from Israel, which he actually created by relying on his own diplomacy. Thus, it seems that the potential distance between the Arabs and Israel has become an actual distance. Therefore, creative activism prevails in the Iranian diplomatic apparatus. In addition to the presence of prominent diplomats in the 14th government, the plans and programs presented by the diplomatic apparatus of the 14th government for managing tensions will be very mature. During these two months that have passed since the life of Mr. Pezzekian’s government, the activism of the diplomatic team has practically brought Iran closer to the Arabs.

Does Mr. Pezzekian’s diplomatic team have the ability to exert pressure on the Arabs and lead them towards mediation between Tehran and Washington and to continue persuading Israel to accept a ceasefire or end military conflicts in the region?

Yes, the Arabs are usually heard well in America, and this activism, whether from Saudi Arabia or Qatar, will affect the level of American support for Israel.

Incidentally, Mr. Pezzekian also met with the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia during this trip. Saudi Arabia, as an important and pivotal player in the region, is also concerned about the outbreak of a comprehensive war in the Middle East; How do you assess Riyadh’s approach and role in managing the current tensions in the region?

Generally, Saudi Arabia, except for Oman and to some extent the UAE, is strategic in some way for other Arab countries. In other words, Umm al-Qarawi is considered a major part of the Arab world. Its bargaining power and bargaining power in Washington is at a high level compared to other Arab countries. Improving its relations with Iran could help improve the United States’ performance in the region with the aim of reducing relations. In addition, Saudi Arabia is definitely one of Iran’s regional competitors, although the two actors can, like Turkey, turn competition into cooperation. Mr. Pezzekian is at the beginning of the road and has a very difficult path ahead of them, although they had a good start.

A meeting was held between Mr. Pezzekian and Hamas leaders in Doha. Can it be claimed that a specific roadmap for reducing tensions was presented by Iran during this meeting?

It is not the case that Iran sets a policy for Hamas. Hamas' political office is in Doha, and the group reportedly met with Mr. Pezzekian after learning about the trip. Mr. Pezzekian arranged the meeting to hear their positions. Hamas has its own positions. It seems that Iran's main position is that if the Palestinians accept a ceasefire, Iran will also accept it. It is possible that the meeting discussed what avenues and proposals Hamas has ahead and what Iran's position will be on these proposals.

 

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