Interview with Etemad Newspaper, October 26, 2025 -
The interview was in Persian and the translation below was done by Ai.
Although the official sunset date of the JCPOA has arrived with the first flares of the dawn sun on October 26 and the JCPOA has officially ended, talk, talk, opposition, and agreement regarding this international document are still ongoing inside and outside the country. Lavrov's statements about how to include snapback in the JCPOA were one of the last such comments that turned the JCPOA issue into an international challenge between Zarif-Lavrov-Sherman. Domestically, supporters and opponents of the JCPOA are also testing their mettle and lining up. A radical group has reduced the JCPOA to its lowest point and placed it among the most damaging treaties, even more damaging than Turkmenchay and Golestan. Some consider it the beginning of a new era, which for the first time in the history of the Islamic Republic was able to break the taboo of direct negotiations between Iran and the United States and elevate the status of diplomacy as one of the main pillars of decision-making in Iran. In an interview with “Etemad,” Sasan Karimi, a faculty member at the University of Tehran and deputy director of the Payab Institute, tries to present a picture of the future prospects of negotiations with the United States while analyzing the achievements and problems of the JCPOA. According to this analyst, the most important achievement of the JCPOA is the de-securitization of the Iranian nuclear file. A ground that is fading with Trump’s efforts to re-securitize the Iranian nuclear file. Pointing out that whatever the JCPOA was, it is in the past and must be overcome, Karimi considers greater authority for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and boldness in decision-making to be the secret to realizing national interests in the future. According to Karimi, one of the missing links in the country is the lack of understanding of the other party’s thinking. A shortcoming that has led Witkoff to start and continue the blame game against Iran. He calls on all sides to allow Iranian diplomats to pursue the Iranian case in a multifaceted manner, based on their internal capacities and self-confidence, so that through it, the national interests of the Iranians can be realized by lifting sanctions and developing international relations.
With the activation of snapback, new attacks against the JCPOA, the negotiations, and Mr. Zarif himself have been organized by radicals. Radicals present the JCPOA as a document of betrayal, even worse than Turkmenchay. Some JCPOA supporters also portray it as an unquestionable dogma. What kind of text do you think the JCPOA is?
The JCPOA pursued several goals, the most important of which was dialogue to resolve the nuclear issue. In some areas, it was successful, and in others, the goals were not achieved.
The first achievement of the JCPOA was breaking the taboo of internal negotiations. In the years after the revolution, negotiating with the US at the level of the Foreign Minister was a taboo that even if someone had conducted a survey about it, they would have gone to prison. This taboo was broken with the JCPOA negotiations, and it became clear that there is a prospect of resolving the issue diplomatically within the country. This achievement is so important that it is impossible to return to the days before the JCPOA. Whether or not negotiations with the US are allowed today depends on how the cost-benefit calculation is made. Everyone has accepted the essence of the issue.
Second, the JCPOA was supposed to change the face of Iran, and it was truly successful in this regard. After the JCPOA, a different face of Iran was shown to the world for 8 years until 1400. In fact, the face of non-negotiables and understanding that had emerged during Ahmadinejad's time disappeared. Another issue was the issue of securitizing Iran and the nuclear issue, which disappeared during those days. Trump then tried to start "re-securitizing" the Iran issue. Today, the claim that Iran intends to build nuclear weapons is no longer taken seriously by the world. Another achievement of the JCPOA was the opening up of banking, economic, trade, etc. issues, which became tangible in 2013. By 2017, these economic, banking, and trade openings were fully in place. The flood of trade that came to Iran from Asia and Europe was indicative of the achievements of this sector.
Critics say that these achievements were short-lived and that the process stopped immediately after Trump became president.
That’s right. By 2018, when Trump withdrew from the JCPOA, this process was heading for failure. Of course, although Trump is the main culprit in this regard, it cannot be denied that our internal mechanisms also became problematic. These mechanisms prevented Iran from sufficiently utilizing the talent that the JCPOA had created. The JCPOA did its job in the fields of trade, banking, and economics, but other infrastructures were needed in the country to achieve the highest level of capital, product, and technology attraction. However, the most important achievement of the JCPOA was the removal of the six UN Security Council resolutions that were approved during the Jalili-Ahmadinejad era. Iran was included in five sections under Chapter 7 and was declared an international threat. After the JCPOA, these threats were suspended for 10 years.
Recently, European countries activated snapback and it was claimed that UN sanctions have returned. These days, contradictory and different discussions are being held about SNAP. Some critics have introduced the founders of the JCPOA without paying attention to the snapback mechanism, and another group of JCPOA supporters believe that with the sunset of the JCPOA, the sanctions are practically irrelevant. From a legal perspective, was snapback foreseen in the JCPOA text?
Although we say that the sanctions have been lifted forever, the UN Security Council Secretariat has a different opinion. If the opponents of the JCPOA have another solution that would suspend the sanctions for 10 years, they should show it. Apart from diplomatic dialogue and negotiations in violation of the JCPOA, I do not know of any other option that any group or movement has proposed. The government's job is to solve problems. The government cannot keep the problems suspended and say that the passage of time will solve the problems! The JCPOA helped the government solve the problems for a while.
It seems that in Iran, there are two general approaches to diplomacy; one represented by Mr. Zarif, which is based on positive balance and attempts to establish constructive relations with all parties. Against this general idea, there are also radicals who were in power during the years 84-92 and 1400-1403 and believe in confrontation, confrontation and tension. In your opinion, which of these discourses contributes more to the realization of national interests?
I believe that all national actors intend to secure national interests, but which discourse has been able to realize at least part of the national interests requires scrutiny.
First, I personally do not think that all actors can be defined under these two discourses. Diplomacy was also ongoing during Ahmadinejad's time, but it was to no avail. This lackluster diplomacy is not only useless but also threatening, while it discredits diplomacy and dialogue and presents negotiation as a failure. I consider lackluster and lackluster diplomacy to be the third side of the two approaches you introduced.
You didn't say how successful diplomacy can be?
I ask you, in which of its strategic sectors has Iran achieved 100% success in the industrial, agricultural, financial, military, production, etc. sectors? It is not wise to expect 100% efficiency from diplomacy alone. The fields of diplomacy, politics, implementation, and management are two steps forward and one step back. That is, if relative success is achieved, one should neither regret nor blame the executors! And stop diplomacy. In other industries, such as military industries, weren't there mistakes? Basically, the reason for Iran's success in the military field is numerous trials and errors. This tolerance should also be taken into account in diplomacy. Today, we are facing an accumulation of problems in the field of diplomacy. If we don't say that these problems with different countries are increasing, we can say that the volume of problems is not decreasing. For example, our problems with Canada or the problems we have with Europe are increasing. If we expect that all the problems in the field of diplomacy will be resolved in one move, this will not happen. If we expect that all the opposing parties of Iran will be chivalrous and loyal and keep their promises and then Iran will talk to them, it is not possible. In the world of states, no one is chivalrous and does not keep their promises, but all countries work together despite the problems. We also work with many of these countries that do not keep their promises. We look at negotiations like a football match that must be won in a limited time! This is not the case, diplomacy is a long-term and permanent process. For example, Iran has neither hostile nor overly friendly relations with a country like the UAE, while at the same time there is significant trade and extensive contacts with this country. Some cases between Iran and the UAE are open and others have been resolved. Iran should think and act in this way about the US or any other country.
If you were to have an in-discourse critique of the JCPOA, what do you think is your most important objection to the JCPOA and its most important achievement?
My most important criticism of the JCPOA is not related to the text of the JCPOA, but to the way it was implemented domestically. For some reason, the JCPOA became a domestic political issue in the winter of 2015 due to its coincidence with the 10th Majlis elections. A great deal of activity for or against the JCPOA was carried out with a political compass, which continues to this day. In fact, the JCPOA fell victim to domestic politics. Perhaps a better text could have been written than the JCPOA, but only in the form of an essay, for the sake of agreement, the best text that could have been agreed upon is the JCPOA. Today, it is not even possible to achieve the same achievements. The JCPOA required self-sacrifice, sacrifice, and courage, and Zarif’s sacrifice as the author of the JCPOA prevented his heirs in the Foreign Ministry from having the courage to make decisions. The JCPOA both de-securitized Iran’s nuclear program and created a deep rift in Western countries. For the first time, the US lost 13-2 in the Security Council and 110-10 in the UN General Assembly. This model could be applied to other international cases. On the other hand, the lifting of the six sanctions of the Security Council, which was also the seventh chapter, was unprecedented. Iraq, which was under this paragraph, was occupied by the US in 2003 and a government was formed there with the US, but note that the sanctions on Iraq were lifted in 2016! That is, 13 years after the change of the Iraqi government and an all-out ground war! In the case of Iran, however, the sanctions were lifted without these resolutions being implemented for a single hour, but due to Iran's limited efforts and the other side's bullying, it was not possible to make the most of this achievement.
Today, the issue of negotiations with the United States is still relevant. If these negotiations are to continue and a basis for an agreement is provided, what will be the maximum achievement of Iran and the minimum concessions of the other side?
Solving the nuclear problem alone is very difficult.
That is, comprehensive talks on other issues are needed?
Not necessarily comprehensive, the word multifaceted may be a more appropriate word. Whether such negotiations will take place or not? It depends on the decision-makers. The psychology of Trump's personality tells us that this person has strengths and weaknesses that must be used for national interests. In order to reach an agreement, Trump must be convinced that an agreement with Iran will give him an achievement that none of the previous US presidents have had! This is how Iran can get more concessions from him than the concessions he gives it. Basically, negotiations are conducted to avoid giving concessions (not to give concessions) so that facilities are not destroyed, military and economic power is not reduced, etc. I don't know where this idea comes from that in negotiations, we are supposed to give concessions that we can't give! Incidentally, when we don't negotiate, we are giving more concessions to the other side. In diplomacy, we should go in a direction where the other side gives us concessions as much as possible but doesn't feel like it's failing.
You are talking about multifaceted and non-nuclear negotiations, but Araqchi has announced that the US has not made any demands on Iran beyond the nuclear issue. With such a command, is it wise to talk about multifaceted negotiations?
First, we should not react to the other side's demands, but rather we should design the talks and impose them on the other side. The initiative should be in our hands. If they don't ask Iran for anything beyond the nuclear issue, it doesn't mean that we should forget the essence of the issue. We are not just going to implement Trump's demands.
But why should we negotiate with the Americans, who have no demands except for the nuclear issue, about missiles and regional issues, etc.?
I say again that we must trap the other side in our own design. An important ability of a senior diplomat is to read the game. The most important part that I am worried about is that Whittaker, Rubio and Trump, who have caused a lot of damage to Iran, will take the blame game away from Iran and show Iran to be the culprit for any lack of agreement and start a new adventure. At the same time, they will also show themselves as champions of peace! None of Whittaker's ideas have been properly identified to date. He is playing the blame game against Iran and we cannot read Whittaker's game and give him a proper response. Whittaker is trying to present Iran as an obstacle to an agreement.
The most important proposition that must be followed at the level of elites, people, and the government is that we should not remain in the past - whether it is a defeat or a victory. Whatever the past was, it is over, and we must move towards the future by gaining experience from the past. We must create the future ourselves, not just react to the demands and initiatives of others in the region, beyond the region, and the world.
The most important proposition that must be monitored is the courage, diligence, ambition, and sufficient authority of the diplomatic apparatus, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In every point and area where Iran has grown and created an achievement, it has been due to courage, ambition, and sufficient authority. The country's diplomacy also needs these indicators to succeed. Personally, we do not see any desirable solution other than diplomacy to solve the equations facing Iran.
Link to interview in Etemad Newspaper
Interview file
